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Abstract - This paper provides evidence on peer eﬀects in educational achievement exploiting for the ﬁrst 
time a unique data set on social networks within primary schools in Uruguay.  The relevance of peer eﬀects 
in education is still largely debated due to the identiﬁcation challenges that the study of social interactions 
poses.   I adopt a recently developed identiﬁcation method that exploits detailed information on social 
networks, i.e.  individual-speciﬁc peer groups.  This method enables me to disentangle endogenous eﬀects 
from contextual eﬀects via instrumental variables that emerge naturally from the network structure. 
Correlated eﬀects are controlled, to some extent, by classroom ﬁxed eﬀects. I ﬁnd signiﬁcant endogenous 
eﬀects in standardized tests for reading and math. A one standard deviation increase in peers’ test score 
increases the individual’s test score by 40% of a standard deviation. This magnitude is comparable to the 
eﬀect of having a mother that completed college. By means of a simulation I illustrate that when schools are 
stratiﬁed by socioeconomic status peer eﬀects may operate as ampliﬁers of educational inequalities.  
JEL: I21,I24, O1 
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As peer eects constitute a form of externality, they are of particular interest to welfare
enhancing policies (Durlauf, 1998; Hoxby, 2000; Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2001). If the
inuence of peers proves to be substantial, this has important implications both in terms of
eciency and inequality. In fact, the alleged existence of peer eects has justied educational
policies ranging from tracking to desegregation programs.1
Due to the dependence of individual behavior on peers' behavior, peer eects determine
a social multiplier or feedback loop and can also lead to multiple equilibria (Manski, 1993;
Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 2003 Soetevent, 2006). As social interactions are likely to
inuence schooling decisions, study habits and individual aspirations, socioeconomic strati-
cation in the formation of social networks can have important implications for the persistence
of educational disparities and more broad social inequalities across generations (Benabou,
1996; Durlauf, 1996, 2004; Bowles, Loury and Sethi, 2007; Graham, 2010). Moreover, the
search for valuable social interactions can lead to inecient stratication (Benabou, 1993,
1996; Zanella, 2007.
However, the relevance of peer eects has been largely debated due to the identication
challenges that the study of social interactions poses and there is still no consensus on their
magnitude. This paper assesses the impact of peer eects in test scores by applying an
identication strategy recently developed in three independent papers: Bramoull e, Djebbari
and Fortin (2009), De Giorgi, Pellizzari and Redaelli (2010) and Lin (2010). This strategy
exploits information on individual specic peer groups in which the existence of partially
overlapping peers allows for peers' peers (and peers' peers peers) characteristics to be used
as instrumental variables to obtain an exogenous source of variation in peers' behavior. In
this way, the strategy allows to isolate the endogenous peer eect, that is, the impact of
peers' test scores on individual test scores. The intuition behind this framework is that
1In the US desegregation plans were prompted by the decision of the Supreme Court in the Brown vs Board of Education that
declared illegal to segregate schools by race and later by the Coleman report that concluded that racial segregation deteriorated
the educational achievement of minority children (Coleman, 1966). Some recent studies have provided some evidence in favor
of this hypothesis (Guryan, 2004; Card and Rothstein, 2007). Nowadays there are many countries implementing forms of
desegregation programs, most notably India is currently implementing a nationwide program that reserves 25% of seats in
private schools for children of socioeconomically disadvantaged families (Right to Education Act). In turn, tracking has been
favored under the assumption that a high achieving peer has more eect on another high achieving student than she has on a
low achieving student (single crossing property).
2peers' peers, who are not the students' peers, can only have an impact on the students'
outcomes indirectly by inuencing the outcomes of her peers. By including classroom xed
eects I am able to control for self-selection of students into schools and unobserved shocks
at the class level. I also show that within a class there does not seem to be self selection into
peers of similar parental education.
I use a data set of primary schools in Uruguay (not used for research purposes so far)
that provides information on reference groups. Students self report who they would like to
invite to their house to play and who they would like to work with for a school assignment.
To the best of my knowledge, the only previous data set with similar characteristics is The
National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health).2 Both Xu Lin (2010) and
Antoni Calv o-Armengol, Eleonora Patacchini, and Yves Zenou (2009) use the information
in Add Health's social networks to study peer eects in education.3 Giacomo De Giorgi,
Michele Pellizzari and Silvia Redaelli (2010) apply a similar strategy to study the inuence
of student's who attended the same classes on student's choice of college major at Bocconi
University.
I nd strong evidence of endogenous eects for both reading and math whereas peer eects
are not signicant for science. A one standard deviation increase in peers' scores increases
the student's scores by 40 percent of a standard deviation in reading (and 37 percent in
math). This is smaller, but comparable to the eect of having a mother that completed
college. In turn, contextual eects do not seem to be signicant. I then try to assess to what
extent peer eects may be amplifying educational inequality in a context in which schools are
stratied by socioeconomic status. After reshuing peers randomly in a simulation exercise,
I estimate that the standard deviations of reading and math scores decrease by 4.5 percent
and 10 percent, respectively.
The main contribution of this paper is to apply a recently developed identication strategy
to a new comprehensive data set which is representative at the country level for students in
their last year of primary school. A signicant advantage of the data set used in this paper
2In that study adolescents were asked to name up to ve female friends and ve male friends and also describe how much
time they had spent together in the last week.
3Bramoull e et al. (2009) also use the Add Health data set to study peer eects on the consumption of recreational services
while Fortin and Yazbeck (2010) study peer eects in fast food consumption.
3relative to most studies that analyze peer eects in test scores is that in this case tests on
reading, math and science were externally set and marked by the national educational author-
ity and thereby not inuenced by teachers' perceptions and/or preferences. Besides, every
student sat for the same tests. 4 Also, the data in this study provides unique information
about network formation in dierent activities (leisure and study) and covers a dierent age
group (11-12 year old) than Add Health. A drawback of this data set relative to the one used
in De Georgi Pellizzari and Redaelli (2010), is that in the latter there is random assignment
into classes. However, the data set used in this paper provides a much more precise idea of
what the real peer group is, it presents a much more heterogeneous scenario of schools and
students and it provides enough variability to draw inference. The second contribution of
the paper is to analyze more in depth the possible implications of the presence of peer eects
as ampliers of educational inequality by means of a simulation exercise. The ndings of
this paper do not directly support any policy intervention but highlight that peer eects in
learning should be taken into account when evaluating any educational policy ranging from
the decision of where to build a new school to more complex policies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the main empirical literature on peer
eects in education and Section 3 discusses the identication strategy. Section 4 describes
the data. Section 5 reports the main results. Section 6 provides some alternative speci-
cations. Section 7 analyzes the implications of the existence of peer eects in a context of
socioeconomic segregation. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Related literature
Although peer eects in education have been studied since the 1960s, there is still no consen-
sus on their relevance (Soetevent, 2006). Coleman (1966) analyzed the relative importance
of dierent factors in educational achievement and concluded that what matters most is the
educational background of peer students, then teacher quality and then school quality. Cole-
man's ndings inspired several studies in sociology and economics. However, the empirical
literature on peer eects has been subjected to powerful criticisms related to identication
4In turn, Add Health contains information on students' grade point average.
4issues raised by Manski (1993, 2000), Mott (2001), and Brock and Durlauf (2001). In the
last two decades several studies have attempted to address these econometric challenges but
the evidence on the relevance of peer eects is still mixed.
As was initially pointed out by Manski (1993) there are three possible eects that can
account for similar behavior within a group. Firstly, children may act similarly because they
are inuenced by their peers' behavior.5 According to Manski's typology these are endoge-
nous eects. Secondly, children may attain similar outcomes also because they are inuenced
by their peers' characteristics. For instance, children may perceive their peers' parents as
role models or parents' involvement in their children's education may also indirectly benet
their peers. These eects are denominated exogenous or contextual eects. Finally, children
in a class may exhibit similar outcomes because of the presence of correlated eects. That
is, they are taught by the same teacher or they all have the same socioeconomic background
or share the same motivation towards studying. Endogenous and exogenous eects reect
the impact of social interactions whereas that is not the case with correlated eects. But
endogenous eects are conceptually dierent from exogenous eects. Only endogenous eects
can generate a social multiplier, that is, a positive feedback loop in which the direct eect
of an improvement in one characteristic of an individual has an indirect eect through social
interactions (Soetevent, 2006).
A rst challenge is to isolate peer eects from correlated eects that arise from sorting
and/or unobserved omitted variables. But the study of social interactions also involves a
simultaneity problem or reection problem: if two individuals aect each other simultane-
ously it is dicult to isolate the causal eect that one has on the other (Sacerdote, 2001).
More broadly, the presence of exogenous eects implies that these characteristics not only
aect the individuals' outcome but also the peers' outcome. However, the researcher only
observes the equilibrium outcome in which all the individuals' outcomes are jointly deter-
mined (Soetevent, 2006). Hence, it is extremely hard to nd an exclusion restriction (ie. an
explanatory variable of individual outcomes that does not aect indirectly peers' outcomes)
and enables one to separate endogenous eects from contextual eects in a linear-in-means
5Empirical studies usually proxy behavior with observed outcomes such as test scores.
5model (Manski, 1993).6 In other words, the structural parameters cannot be recovered from
the reduced form as a consequence of collinearities between individual and contextual vari-
ables. An additional challenge to the study of peer eects is that the researcher should know
a priori the group or individuals with whom a student may interact. Indeed, identication of
social interactions is not possible when group composition is unknown (Manski, 1993, 2000).
In what follows, I review the main strategies that studies have pursued in order to overcome
these challenges.
2.1 Correlated eects
Sacerdote (2001) and Zimmerman (2003) study peer eects in education by exploiting data
on randomly assigned college roommates. Random assignment allows them to separate social
interactions from correlated eects. Graham (2008) suggests a novel method for identifying
social interactions using conditional variance restrictions. By using experimental data on
project STAR, Graham identies the excess variance due to peer eects from that due to
group-level heterogeneity and/or sorting.7 Graham's estimations suggest a substantial impact
of peer quality on kindergarten achievement.
In turn, Hoxby (2000) identies social interactions by exploiting the variation in gender
and racial composition of a grade within a school in adjacent years. Ammermueller and
Pischke (2009) use changes in composition across classrooms within the same grade. These
strategies are of use for isolating correlated eects as long as such changes provide sucient
variation (Nechyba, 2006). Other studies use school by grade eects (Lin, 2010) or school by
grade eects together with student eects (Hanushek, 2003).
2.2 The reection problem
Many studies do not disentangle endogenous and exogenous eects and thereby estimate a
composite social interaction eect or assume one form of interaction only. This is the case
in: Sacerdote (2001); Zimmerman (2003); Graham (2008); Hoxby (2000) and Ammermueller
6This is the standard model used in the literature in which, the outcome of an individual is linearly related to her own
characteristics, the corresponding mean characteristics of her peers and their mean outcome.
7The experimental feature of project STAR enables him to assume that distribution of teacher quality is random across
classrooms.
6et al. (2009). Being able to isolate endogenous eects is of particular importance as only
endogenous eects can generate a social multiplier. Hanushek et al. (2003) estimate endoge-
nous and exogenous eects separately by instrumenting the peers' score with their lagged
achievement. Boozer and Cacciola (2001) use classmates' past exposure to a class reduction
treatment as an instrument for peer achievement. The reection problem can be overcome
also by specifying a model in which behavior varies nonlinearly with group mean behavior
or alternatively a model that varies linearly with some characteristic of group behavior other
than the mean (Manski, 2000; Brock and Durlauf, 2001).
Another possibility is to use an instrumental variable that directly aects the behavior
of some but not all the group members. In this line, endogenous and exogenous eects can
be disentangled under a partial-population experiment setting whereby the outcome variable
of some randomly chosen members of the group is exogenously modied (Mott, 2001).
Such strategy is applied by Bobonis and Finan (2009) who study neighborhood spillovers
from induced school participation of elegible children to the PROGRESA program. Cooley
(2010) disentangles endogenous and exogenous eects through the introduction of student
accountability policies in North Carolina public schools. These policies imposed an additional
cost on low performance and thereby shifted the eort only of those who perceived themselves
to be in danger of failing. Cooley identies peer spillovers by comparing classrooms with
varying percentages of students that are held accountable to classrooms of similar composition
where students were not held accountable. A novel strategy for disentangling endogenous
from exogenous eects involves using partially overlapping reference groups (Lin, 2010; Calv o-
Armengol et al., 2009; De Giorgi et al., 2010; Laschever, 2009). I describe this strategy in
depth in Section 3.
2.3 Reference groups
Due to data constraints the reference group is often dened arbitrarily (Nechyba, 2006). In
education, most studies assume individuals interact in broad groups and are aected by an
average intra-group externality that aects identically all the members of a grade within a
school or a classroom. Upon the availability of data on social networks provided by the Add
7Health data set some studies have considered individual specic reference groups. Lin (2010)
assumes that the individuals named by a student as friends within a grade are her reference
group. Calv o-Armengol et al. (2009) concentrate on the position of each individual named
in a social network (Katz-Bonacich index).8
3 Identication Strategy
Bramoull e et al. (2009) determine the conditions under which endogenous and contextual
eects are identied when individuals interact through social networks known by the re-
searcher and when correlated eects are assumed to be xed within groups. In this paper I
follow their identication strategy. The model is an extension of the linear-in-means model
developed by Manski (1993) and Mott (2001), but now each individual has his own specic









pi +ci, E[cijxci;c] = 0 (1)
Where yci is the test score of student i, xci is a 1xK vector of individual characteristics
(for simplicity assume from now onwards there is only one characteristic). Each student i
may have a specic peer group or set of nominated friends Pi of size pi.  captures the
endogenous or behavioral eect while  reects the exogenous eect of peers' predetermined
characteristics. In order to address the problem of correlated eects, I introduce classroom
xed eects that capture unobserved variables common to students in the same classroom.
This assumption allows for correlation between the network's unobserved common character-
istics (ie. teacher quality or similar attitude towards studying) and observed characteristics
such as parental education. However, individual characteristics are assumed to be strictly
exogenous after conditioning on the classroom xed eect.
8This measure counts, for each node in a given network, the total number of direct and indirect paths of any length in the
network stemming from that node. Paths are weighted by a factor that decays geometrically with path length.
8Let Ic be the identity matrix for classroom c and  the corresponding vector of ones. Let
G be an nxn interaction matrix for the n students in classroom c, with Gij = 1
pi if j was
named by i and 0 otherwise. Note that G is row-normalized. The model in matrix notation
can be written as:
yc = cc + Gcyc + xc + Gcxc + c;
E[cjxc;Gc;c] = 0 (2)
In order to eliminate classroom xed eects, I then apply a within transformation pre-
multiplying equation(2) by Dc = Ic  1
nccc
0. That is, I average equation (1) over all students
in i's classroom and then subtract it from i's equation. The structural model can now be
written as:
Dcyc = DcGcyc +Dcxc +DcGcxc +Dcc (3)
with the reduced form being:
Dcyc = Dc(Ic Gc) 1(Ic+Gc)xc+Dc(Ic Gc) 1c (4)
Bramoull e et al. (2009) show that if the matrices I;G;G2 and G3 are linearly indepen-
dent social interactions are identied. This implies E[DGyjx] is not perfectly collinear with
(Dx;DGx). If that is so, then (DG2x;DG3x;:::) are valid instruments for the outcomes of
ones' peers.9 In other words, the characteristics of the friends' friends of a student (and
also friends'friends friends and further) who are not her friends serve as instruments for the
outcomes of her own friends, thus solving the reection problem. The intuition behind this
9These variables have been previously transformed as deviations from their corresponding classroom mean.
9framework is that the characteristics of friends' friends who are not the student's friends can
only have an impact on the student's behavior indirectly by inuencing the behavior of her
friends. Bramoull e et al. (2009) note that a sucient condition for identication is that the
diameter of the network (ie. maximal friendship distance between any two students in the
network) is greater than or equal to 3. In a directed network this requires that there is at
least one case in which i named j who named k who in turn named l and i did not name k
nor l and j did not name l as a friend. However, the authors show that identication often
holds in transitive networks as well. In this case identication comes from the directed nature
of the network (Bramoull e et al., 2009). In general terms, social eects can be disentangled
as long as there is some variation in reference groups. In this paper identication comes
from both the existence of partially overlapping groups (links of distance 3 or more) and the
directed nature of the network (ie. the direction of inuence from one node to another). 10
A crucial identication assumption is that there are no unobserved characteristics that
dier among children in a classroom and aect both the likelihood of becoming friends and
achievement. For instance, if the most able children become friends among themselves and
attain better scores than the rest of the class then the networks will not be exogenous con-
ditional on c and xc and estimates of social interactions will be inconsistent. Alternatively,
if highly disruptive children tend to interact mostly with disruptive children and also score
poorly (due to this unobserved characteristic and not due to their peers' inuence), this
would also yield inconsistent estimates. Of course, testing whether there is self selection
into peers based on unobservables is not feasible. In section 4, I present some evidence that
suggests that at least there does not seem to be self selection based on observables.
4 Data
The analysis is based on a unique data set: the fth Evaluaci on Nacional de Aprendiza-
jes took place in October 2009 and consists of a sample of 322 schools (24% of Uruguayan
schools) in which approximately 8600 students were evaluated. The sample is representative
of sixth grade students (children of 11-12 years old, last grade in primary school) and covers
10If student A names B but B does not name A, B is considered A's peer but A is not considered B's peer.
10children in both private and public schools. The evaluation consists of math, science and
reading tests which were externally set and marked by ANEP, the central authority respon-
sible for education in Uruguay.11 This represents a major advantage compared to data sets
in which students are graded by their teachers as teachers may have dierent preferences
or expectations on their students which could inuence grading within a class. Every stu-
dent evaluated took the same reading, math and science test. The data set also includes
questionnaires to students, their family, teachers and the principals of the schools.
Two questions in the students' questionnaire are of particular importance for this study
as they provide information on reference groups:
If you were to invite two classmates to play at your house who would you invite?
If you were to invite two classmates to work on an assignment for school who would you
invite?
Figure 1 describes the network structure resulting from the information provided by two
questions for one actual classroom. Examples of links of distance greater or equal to 3 (that
satisfy the identication condition) can be observed.12 Also, I checked that the matrices
I;G;G2;G3 are linearly independent (where G is matrix that contains all the classroom
networks), satisfying the identication condition established by Bramoull e et al. (2009).13
The reference group questions mentioned before determine that a student can name a
maximum number of 4 peers. This represents a limitation as the individual's reference
group could be larger and then one would not be capturing it completely. Considering both
questions (party and assignment) on average children named 2.4 distinct peers who can be
identied in the data set.14 One could have expected that students would name their closest
friends in the party question but not necessarily in the assignment one.15 However, 65% of
11Administraci on Nacional de Educaci on P ublica (ANEP).
12For example, individual 7 named 8 who named 12 who named 13, 7 did not name either 12 or 13 and 8 did not name 13.
13 in turn, named 9, 14, 2 and 1, who had not been named by the previous individuals.
13This was checked by vectorizing matrices I;G;G2;G3 and verifying that the matrix formed by these four vectors is of rank
4.
14It may happen that students named children that either were absent in the date of the evaluation or that do not have
information on family characteristics. Taking into account those students who cannot be considered in the estimations, children
on average named 2.7 distinct peers, 15% named only one peer in the party question and 14.6% only named one peer in the
assignment question. There are also 249 individuals who are isolated, that is, did not name anybody in the two questions.
15Note that the fact a student i named j does not necessarily imply that they are actually friends. It could also be the case
that i would like to be friends with j because she admires or likes j even if currently they are not close friends. Nevertheless,
what matters is that j is likely to exert inuence on i just because i considers j as her reference group. The strategy assumes
that children are inuenced only by the classmates they name.
11students repeated at least one peer in the two questions (40% repeated the name of one peer
and 25% repeated the two peers named in the party question in the assignment question, see
Table 1).
On average children were named 1.7 times in the party question and also the assignment
question (ie. were considered the reference group of others). Table 2 shows the percentage
of children named in the two questions and how many times they were named in each. 14%
of students were not named by anyone either in the party or the assignment question. In
turn, 69% were named between 1 and 4 times in the party question and 66% were named
between 1 and 4 times in the assignment question. The general pattern suggests that children
who were named by others as peers are distributed quite uniformly within classrooms, that
is, the whole class did not name the same student. This contributes to identication as it
increases the distance in terms of links between individuals (if all the arrows were pointing
towards a few students the likelihood of nding links of distance 3 or more would be lower).
As was previously mentioned, most children who are named in the assignment question are
also named in the party question and it is not common to be named many times in the party
question and to not be named in the assignment question or vice versa. Another interesting
feature is that the mean of the average peer score variable is higher than the mean of the
individual score. This is so also when only the party network is considered, which could
suggest that being a good student increases popularity (see Table 3).
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the selected variables to be used in the esti-
mation for the original data set and the nal sample. Even though the family survey provides
a wide range of socioeconomic information, not all the students have complete information
on all the variables. This is particularly problematic as it complicates the calculation of
peer variables. In order to minimize the number of observations that are dropped because
of missing information on a certain variable, I include in the regressions only a few variables
that have a low percentage of missing and are commonly used in studies on education. The
nal sample for each test (math, reading and science) consists of all the individuals who have
not only valid information on their score and family characteristics but also on their friends'
score and characteristics and on their friends' friends, and friends' friends friends character-
12istics. The number of observations varies in the nal data set for each test because tests were
implemented in dierent dates and some children did not sit for all the three tests because
they were absent. The nal sample exhibits slightly better socioeconomic characteristics and
test scores but it is still a substantial part of the original sample (more than 80% of the
students that were evaluated).
As mentioned in section 3, the identication strategy would be invalidated if children
sort out with children who are similar in an unobserved way which is correlated with their
academic achievement. In line with Drago and Galbiati (forthcoming) and Bayer, Ross and
Topa (2008) I analyze whether there is sorting on observables and nd that this does not
seem to be the case for the core indicator of socioeconomic background and predictor of
schooling outcomes: mothers' education. As Bayer et al. (2008) argue this does not prove
that there is no sorting on unobservables but provides information on whether holding this
assumption is reasonable or not. For this purpose, I run OLS regressions for each individual
characteristic as a function of the corresponding peer characteristic (Table 5 reports the
estimated coecient for each regression). When classroom xed eects are included the
coecient on peers' mother education becomes negative and close to zero (approximately
-0.1 depending on the education level). Being a repeater is positively related to having
friends' who are repeaters. This could be problematic if these variables are correlated to
unobservables that also inuence scores. However, that repeaters tend to name repeaters
could be due to the fact that they have known other repeaters for a longer period relative to
the rest of the class and not necessarily due to other unobservables correlated with scores.16
There is a very high correlation between the students' gender and his/her peers' gender.
Table 6 also shows that children of similar socioeconomic background within a class do not
seem to sort out. For instance, 44% of students whose mother's education is above the class
median named only peers whose mothers' education is also above the class median but 39%
of students whose mother's education is below the class median also named only peers whose
mothers' education was above the class median. In this sense, assigment to peers within a
class seems to be quite random in terms of observable socioeconomic characteristics. It can
16Table 11 shows estimates of peer eects excluding classrooms in which the correlation between being a repeater and having
peers who are repeaters is high.
13also be observed that students who score above or equal to the class median in the reading,
math or science have very similar peers compared to students with scores below the class
median (see Table 6). This suggests that situations such as high ability students sorting
with high ability students or disruptive children that attain low scores interacting only with
disruptive children do not seem to prevail.
5 Results
In this section I present estimates of peer spillovers in achievement for reading, math and
science standardized tests following the strategy outlined in Section 3. The reference group
was computed weighting equally all the distinct peers named in the two questions (party
and assignment).17 Table 7 reports OLS estimates both with and without classroom xed
eects.18 When classroom xed eects are included, the OLS estimates suggest endogenous
eects are only signicant for math and are very small. Table 8 presents 2SLS estimates where
standard errors are clustered at the school level.19 Notice that the F-tests of the excluded
instruments in the rst stage for the three tests (math, reading and science) indicate that
weak instruments are not a concern.
The estimates in Table 8 indicate that endogenous eects are large and highly signicant
in reading and math whereas they are not signicant for science.20 A one standard deviation
increase in peers' reading score increases own performance by 40% of a standard deviation.
This is smaller but comparable to having a mother that completed college. It is also similar
in magnitude to the impact of having been held back in school at least one year. Endogenous
eects are slightly stronger in reading than in math.21 These estimates are in between those
obtained by Graham (2008) for kindergarten students and those reported by Lin (2010) for
17Table 13 presents other reference group specications.
18In the nal sample there are 395 classrooms or groups in the reading estimates, 392 in the math data set and 394 for science.
19Clustering at the classroom level does not alter the signicance of the estimates. It seemed more reasonable to cluster at
the school level as clustering at the classroom level would imply assuming zero correlation between classrooms within a school.
20The correlation among the tests is around 0.6. The reason why peer eects do not seem to be signicant for science should
be further explored. Math and reading tests assess core cognitive skills which could be improved by interacting in class with
ones'peers. In turn, the science test could contain more areas in which more memory is required. An interesting fact is that
there seems to be a higher motivation towards science and it is not perceived as dicult as math or reading. Table 9 shows how
often children consider that they almost always understand what they are taught. This percentage is higher in science than in
math and reading. Also, the percentage of children who consider that they enjoy a lot what they are taught is higher in science
than in math and reading.
21In turn, Carrell et al. (2008) nd stronger eects in math and science and not signicant in foreign language courses and
physical education among students in the United States Air Force Academy.
14adolescents. This could suggest peers' inuence in academic achievement decreases with age.
A straightforward measure of the social multiplier cannot be computed in this framework as
some children are named more times than others hence the aggregate sum of peers' scores is
not directly comparable to the sum of individual scores.
Exogenous eects are never signicant, suggesting that social interactions operate mainly
through peers' actions. This is also the case in the study by De Giorgi et al. (2010) and
in Laschever (2009).22 Cooley (2010) gets some counterintuitive results as for the impact of
contextual eects and argues that after conditioning on peer achievement the expected sign
of contextual eects is ambiguous. In turn, Lin (2010) nds that many peers' characteristics
are signicant in explaining GPA performance.
The fact that the 2SLS estimates are higher than OLS may seem unexpected. One reason
why the OLS estimates may be biased downwards is due to classical measurement error in
peers' scores. Also, it could be due to the presence of heterogeneous peer eects on students'
scores. In that case, (consistent) OLS estimates an average eect across all students while
the 2SLS estimand is a weighted average of responses to a unit change in treatment for those
whose treatment is aected by the instrument (Angrist and Imbens, 1995).23 The weighting
function could be reecting how the compliers (peers who due to social interactions [either
endogenous or exogenous] increase their own scores) are distributed over the range of scores.24
The fact that 2SLS estimates are larger than OLS could be due to peers eects being larger
for those who have peers who are themselves positively aected by other peers (instrument
compliers). It should be noted that De Giorgi et al. (2010) also nd a negative bias in the
OLS estimates. Their explanation applied to this context suggests the presence of network
specic shocks that work in dierent directions.
22Laschever (2009) examines how social ties formed during WWI aect a veterans likelihood of employment in the 1930 census.
23Two stage least squares can estimate a local average treatment eect in the presence of heterogeneous treatment eects
as long as the monotonicity condition is satised. This additional restriction requires that the instrumental variable aects
treatment intensity in the same direction for everyone (Angrist and Imbens, 1995). There may be heterogeneous eects due to
observable characteristics (ie. treatment eects are homogeneous after conditioning for observable characteristics) or alternatively
individuals with the same characteristics may have dierent eects of the treatment.
24Angrist and Imbens (1995) show that 2SLS in a framework of variable treatment intensity produces an average of the
derivative with the weight given to each possible value of the treatment variable in proportion to the instrument-induced change
in the cumulative distribution function of the treatment variable at that point. In addition, 2SLS with covariates generates
an average of covariate-specic average causal responses and 2SLS with multiple instruments generates a weighted average of
averages causal responses for each instrument. As the above estimated model includes variable treatment intensity, multiple
instruments and covariates, the resulting weights are a combination of all these.
156 Alternative specications
In this section I provide some alternative specications for the previously reported results.
Table 10 presents the results following the same specication as in Table 8 but including the
information provided by approximately 700 observations which are not included in the esti-
mates. These students have complete information on their scores and characteristics but do
not have valid information on their friends (either because they did not name any or mostly
because the peers they named were absent the day of the tests or do not have information on
socioeconomic characteristics) and thereby cannot be included in the regression. However,
these observations provide valuable information to compute the peers' peers characteristics
and peers' peers peers characteristics of other students.25 The estimated endogenous coe-
cients are slightly larger than those in Table 8.
Table 11 replicates estimates in Table 8 but just considering classrooms in which selection
on observables among peers is low (measured by the correlation between and individual char-
acteristic and peers' characteristic at the classroom level). The rst three columns present
the estimates for individuals in which the within classroom correlation between the student's
mother education and their peers' mother education is lower than 0.3, that is, classrooms
where children do not sort into peers with similar socioeconomic background. Peer eects
are still signicant in reading and large in magnitude. The next three columns show the
estimates for individuals in classrooms in which the correlation between being an repeater
and having peers who are repeaters is lower than 0.3. Estimates are signicant and large in
magnitude for reading, math and science.
In Table 8 I include school level dummies for mothers' education and peers' mothers
education and use as instruments an index of peers'peers mothers' education and peers'
peers' peers' mothers' education. The instruments are variables with values ranging from 1
to 9 that reect dierent levels of education but a variable of years of education cannot be
reconstructed precisely.26 In Table 12 I perform an additional estimation in which instead
25I then correct peers' peers characteristics and peers' peers peers characteristics for the cases where these observations were
named as direct peers by multiplying by a factor that weights peers without considering them. For instance, if A named B who
named C and D and D does not name anybody (or names someone who was absent), I use D's information to compute A's peers'
peers characteristics but then I correct by a factor that instead of weighting D's peers and C's peers equally when computing
B's peers' peers characteristics, it assigns all the weight to C who is the only one who has valid information on his/her friends.
26In the survey mothers were asked to mark yes/no to the following options: 1) did not attend primary, 2) incomplete primary,
16of including dummies for dierent levels of mother education I try to reconstruct years of
schooling with some measurement error.27 In this case, I express in exactly the same way
covariates and instruments. The results are quite similar to those in Table 8: endogenous
peer eects are large for reading and math and not signicant for science while exogenous
eects are never signicant.
Finally, Table 13 reports the endogenous coecient estimates obtained when considering
alternative reference groups. When using the network information contained in only one
question (party or assignment) the test of the null hypothesis loses some power as less obser-
vations are then valid (less students have information on their peers and peers' peers) and in
general the network information is also weakened (many individuals have less peers). Overall
the endogenous coecient estimates do not dier substantially in the dierent specications
but it is larger and more signicant when considering only the peers named in the assignment
question than when considering only the peers named in the party question. This could be
due to children choosing better students as their reference group for study purposes. The
mean of peer scores is higher in the assignment network than that of the party network.
However, as shown in Section 4 most children are named in the two questions. Only 11%
were named by at least one person in the party question and were not named by anyone in
the assignment question. I also estimated a specication in which a peer who is named in
both questions is weighted more than one that is only named in either the party question or
the assignment question.28 In this case, the F-tests of the excluded instruments for reading,
math and science always reach acceptable levels and the estimates are slightly smaller in
magnitude than those in Table 8.
The estimated model is an extension of the standard linear-in-means social interaction
model in which student specic reference groups are allowed. This model constrains peer
eects to have distributional consequences but no eciency consequences. As a rst attempt
to see whether peer eects are heterogeneous among dierent kinds of students I estimate
3) complete primary, 4) 1 or 2 years of secondary school, 5) 3 years of secondary school, 6) 4 or 5 years of secondary school, 7)
complete high school (6 years)), 8) incomplete college, 9) complete college.
27This variable goes from 0 to 16. For instance, I assigned 16 years of schooling to mothers who have completed college but
college in Uruguay may take more than 4 years. For the case of answers indicating 1 or 2 years of secondary school I assumed
it was just 1 (that is, 7 years of schooling).
28For instance, if a student names A and B in the party question and A and C in the assignment question, then the peer score
and characteristics are computed assigning weights of 0.25 to B and C and 0.5 to A.
17peer eects for children with dierent levels of mother's education separately. However, when
doing so estimates tend to lose signicance (see Table 14). The only endogenous eect that
is signicant for both reading and math is the one for children whose mothers have nished
primary school but did not complete highschool. This could be due to the fact that this is the
largest category in the sample (42% of children in the sample share this characteristic). It is
interesting that the peers' mother education (contextual eect) is positive and signicant in
reading only for children whose own mothers have the lowest education levels. Endogenous
peer eects are signicant for both females and males. In reading the endogeneous eect
seems to be larger for females whereas it is the opposite case for math.
7 Potential impact on educational inequality
Social interactions are likely to inuence schooling decisions, study habits and individual
aspirations. For this reason, socioeconomic stratication in the formation of social networks
can have important implications for the persistence of educational disparities and more broad
social inequalities across generations (Benabou, 1996; Durlauf, 1996, 2004; Bowles, Loury and
Sethi, 2007; Graham, 2010). In this section, I try to assess to what extent inequalities in
educational outcomes are amplied by peer eects operating in a context of socioeconomic
stratication.
Although Uruguay is the least unequal country in terms of income distribution in Latin
America, inequalities in the Uruguayan educational system are large even when compared to
other Latin American countries. In the PISA 2009 math tests, Uruguay achieved the highest
mean and the highest scores at the percentile ninety ve compared to all the Latin American
countries that participated in the tests. But the scores achieved by the percentile ve of the
distribution were lower than those achieved by Chile and Mexico (both with a lower mean).
Furthermore, Uruguay's drop out rates at age fteen are signicantly higher than those
in Chile, if the same percentage of fteen year old students attended high school in both
countries, these greater inequalities in test scores observed in Uruguay potentially could
be even larger.29 These severe educational inequalities are likely to translate into greater
29In 2006, only 82% of fteen year olds attended the educational system in Uruguay compared to 97% in Chile.
18socioeconomic inequalities in the future through wages. One possible determinant of these
high degree of inequality is that socioeconomic segregation may be contributing to amplify
inequality through peer eects. In the Uruguayan public school system students are assigned
to schools according to their neighborhood of residence. This is particularly important in
terms of how neighborhood socioeconomic stratication impacts on education. In order to
illustrate the level of socioeconomic stratication present in the data set I computed some
simple ANOVA estimates: 42% of the variance in the variable that summarizes students'
mother education is due to between school variance and 45% of the variation in a wealth
index that considers dierent durable goods a household may own also is attributed to
dierences between schools.
In order to try to quantify the potential impact of socioeconomic segregated peers in
inequality, I compare the distribution of the actual reading and math scores with the one
resulting from reshuing peers among the sample of children who have the same number
of peers.30 That is, if an individual originally had named 3 peers I assign him randomly
3 new peers that had been named by individuals who in total had named 3 peers (each of
these 3 new peers was named by dierent students). In this sense, I maintain the degree
of popularity (number of times a child is named by others) and the degree of sociability
(children maintain the number of friends they originally had) individuals in the actual sample
exhibit. This makes sense as all a hypothetic social planner would be able to do is reassign
children to dierent schools but not alter how popular and/or sociable they are.31 I then
multiply all the individual characteristics and peer characteristics by the coecients of the
original regressions and add the residuals from the original predicted reading and math
scores. Figure 2 compares the actual scores' distributions with the resulting distributions
averaged over 100 simulations. As expected, changing actual peers into random peers would
make the distribution more concentrated around its mean and would reduce its mass in the
top achieving tail and the low achieving tail. The actual reading score has a mean of 512
30I do not reshue among the total data set because the distribution of the number of peers named is not uniformly distributed
along socioeconomic characteristics. In particular, children belonging to higher socioeconomic strata tend to name slightly more
peers. As children from higher socioeconomic neighborhoods tend to have better scores this determines that when peers are
reshued among all individuals in the data set the mean of the peerscore variable slightly increases (because of the lower number
of peers named by children in poorer neighborhoods) and thereby complicates distributional comparissons.
31Still, the estimation relies on the extreme assumption that these randomly matched peers would become friends.
19and a standard deviation of 99 whereas the simulated distribution has the same mean and
a standard deviation of 94.6. The absolute gap between the percentile 95 and percentile
5 drops from 309.4 to 302.6. In turn, the distribution of math scores reduces its standard
deviation from 100 to 90 and the gap between percentile 95 and percentile 5 drops from
313.1 to 286.7 (see Table 15). One possible reason why the impact in terms of inequality
reduction is not larger is that actual friendship ties within schools do not seem to be driven by
schooling achievement as was shown in Table 6. Also, notice that these estimations assume
peer eects were homogeneous for all students, the impact of reshuing students randomly
could be much greater if in turn treatment eects are heterogeneous among children with
dierent socioeconomic background, in particular, if lower socioeconomic students beneted
more from social interactions.
This is an out of sample computational experiment that intends to proxy in an extreme
way which could be the distributional impact of policies intervening in the determination of
socioeconomic interaction environments for individuals. Durlauf (1998) denes these type
of policies associational redistribution: "...an interactions-based perspective alters the redis-
tributive focus away from policies designed to equalize per-student expenditure to those that
attempt to equalize the total school environment." (Durlauf, 1998, p. 267).32 I regard it
as a useful exercise but i am aware of its limitations. First, as Piketty (2000) notes, these
policies can be particularly controversial as individuals generally consider the choice of peers
as something public policy should not interfere. Second, evidence regarding the impact of
desegregation plans is mixed. Rivkin and Welch (2006, p.1043), review several studies that
assess the impact of school desegregation and conclude that the "...eects of integration on
black students remains largely unsettled. If there is a marginal consensus, it is that eects
are probably small, but benecial". Third, if peer eects operate mainly via friendship net-
works this makes it dicult to assert the impact of moving a child from a school with a low
average socioeconomic background to one with a higher average background or vice versa, as
it is not certain whether he/she would establish a link with children of dierent characteris-
32These policies are generally more justied in situations in which equality can be improved without aecting eciency or
when both can be improved. Incorporating the eciency consequences of dierent distributions of associations would imply a
non linear in means framework which is scarce in the literature of peer eect in education. One recent contribution in this line
is that of Graham, Imbens and Ridder (2009).
20tics. For instance, evidence from the Add Health dataset suggests simple exposure to more
heterogeneous schools does not promote interracial integration per se.33 Finally, this exer-
cise abstracts from changes in teacher behavior due to student reassignment. Duo, Dupas
and Kremer (forthcoming) conclude that tracking could favor both high and low achieving
students as it allows teachers to better adapt their instruction level if they face incentives
to teach to the top of the distribution. However, it should be noted that in Uruguay public
school teachers' wages are not linked to their students' achievement.
8 Conclusions
In this paper I apply a recently developed identication strategy to a unique data set of
primary schools in Uruguay. This strategy enables me to solve the reection problem and
hence disentangle endogenous eects from contextual eects, two social interaction eects
with very distinct policy implications. The intuition behind this framework is that peers'
peers who are not the student's peers can only have an impact on the student's behavior
indirectly by inuencing the behavior of her peers. Correlated eects are dealt with by
including classroom xed eects. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.
The ndings of this paper point to signicant peer eects in academic achievement at
primary school level. The estimates suggest there are strong endogenous peer eects: a
one standard deviation increase in ones' peers score increases own scores by 40 percent of
a standard deviation in reading and 37 percent of a standard deviation in math. This
magnitude is smaller but comparable to having a mother that completed college. In turn,
contextual eects do not seem to be signicant, suggesting that it is the others' achievement
what matters for own outcomes and not their characteristics.
The high signicance of peer eects signals their potential importance as ampliers of
educational inequalities in socioeconomically stratied environments. That is, if whom one
interacts at school with matters and if schools are highly stratied in terms of socioeconomic
background, dierences in the social environment will contribute to polarization in outcomes.
The exercise performed in Section 7 suggests that if peers were assigned randomly, the
33See Moody (2001).
21standard deviation in scores would decrease roughly between 5% and 10%.
Social interactions can be thought of as aecting individuals' preferences, constraints and
expectations (Manski, 2000). But research on specic mechanisms is still scarce. Some of
the most notable contributions in this respect are: Akerlof and Kranton, 2002; Kremer and
Miguel 2007, Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005, Lazear, 2001. There is also relevant evidence
from other disciplines such as social psychology and anthropology.34 In further research
it would be particularly interesting to explore through which mechanisms peer spillovers
operate.
References
[1] Akerlof, G. and Kranton R.,(2002) "Identity and Schooling: Some Lessons for the
Economics of Education", Journal of Economic Literature 40:4, 11671201.
[2] Ammermueller, A and Pischke J. (2009) "Peer Eects in European Primary Schools:
Evidence from the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study", Journal of Labor
Economics, vol. 27, no. 3, 315-348.
[3] Angrist, J. and Imbens G. (1995) "Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation of Average
Causal Eects in Models with Variable Treatment Intensity", Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 90(430), 431-442.
[4] Austen-Smith, D and Fryer R. (2005) "An Economic Analysis of 'Acting White'",
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(2), 551-583.
[5] Bayer, P., Ross, S. and Topa G. (2008) "Place of Work and Place of Residence: Informal
Hiring Networks and Labor Market Outcomes", Journal of Political Economy, 116(6),
1150-1196.
34Doise and Mugny (1984) have documented that children working in pairs or in small groups come to solve problems more
eectively than when they work alone. This can lead to a conict of views, in which one child's perceptions and strategy directly
stimulate the other's to develop new strategies. A widely studied case of peer pressure in the context of educational attainment
is how black peers discourage other blacks from excelling academically by considering it an 'acting white' behavior (Fordham and
Ogbu, 1986). Individuals exposed to these social interactions have disincentives to invest in education due to the fact that they
may be rejected by their social peer group. Peer eects may even operate on the way teachers react to students. Ferguson (2003)
suggests there is evidence that teachers' perceptions, expectations, and behaviors interact with students' beliefs, behaviors, and
work habits in ways that help to perpetuate the gap in academic attainment observed between blacks and whites.
22[6] Benabou, R. (1993) "Workings of a City: Location, Education and Production", Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 3, 619-652.
[7] Benabou, R. (1996) "Equity and Eciency in Human Capital Investment: The Local
Connection", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Apr., 1996), 237-264.
[8] Bobonis, G and Finan, F. (2009) "Neighborhood Peer Eects in Secondary School
Enrollment Decisions", The Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(4), 695716.
[9] Boozer, M and Cacciola S. (2001) "Inside the Black Box of project STAR: estimation of
peer eects using experimental data", Center Discussion Paper No. 832, Yale University.
[10] Bowles, S.; Loury, G. and Sethi R. (2007) "Is Equal Opportunity Enough? A Theory
of Persistent Group Inequality".
[11] Bramoull e, Y., Djebbari, H. and Fortin, B. (2009) "Identication of peer eects through
social networks". Journal of Econometrics 150, 41-55.
[12] Brock, W. and Durlauf, S. (2001), "Interactions-Based Models", in Handbook of Econo-
metrics, Heckman and Leamer (Eds), Elsevier Science B.V.
[13] Calv o-Armengol, A.; Patacchini, E. and Zenou, Y. (2009) "Peer Eects and Social
Networks in Education" Review of Economic Studies, Volume 76, Issue 4, 12391267.
[14] Card, D. and Rothstein, J. (2007) "Racial segregation and the blackwhite test score
gap", Journal of Public Economics, 91, 2158 2184
[15] Carrel, S: Fullerton, R. and West, J. (2009) "Does your cohort matter? Measuring peer
eects in college achievement", Journal of Labor Economics, 27(3), 439464.
[16] Coleman, J. (1966), Equality of Educational Opportunity, U.S. GPO, Washington,
D.C.
[17] Cooley, J. (2010) "Desegregation and the Achievement Gap: Do Diverse Peers Help?"
[18] De Giorgi, G.; Pellizzari, M. and Redaelli, S. (2010) "Identication of Social Interactions
through Partially Overlapping Peer Groups" American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics, Vol 2, Iss. 2, 241-75.
23[19] Doise, W., and Mugny, G. (1984). The social development of the intellect. New York:
Pergamon Press.
[20] Drago, F., and Galbiati, R. (forthcoming). "Indirect Eects of a Policy Altering Crim-
inal Behavior: Evidence from the Italian Prison Experiment", American Economic
Journal: Applied Economics
[21] Duo, E., Dupas, P. and Kremer, M. (forthcoming) "Peer Eects, Teacher Incentives,
and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya",
American Economic Review.
[22] Durlauf, S. (1996) "A Theory of Persistent Income Inequality", Journal of Economic
Growth 1, 75-93.
[23] Durlauf, S. (1998) "Associational Redistribution: A Defense", in Recasting Egalitari-
anism: new rules for communities, states and markets, Olin Wright (Ed),261-284.
[24] Durlauf, S. (2004) "Neighborhood Eects", Handbook of Regional and Urban Eco-
nomics, vol. 4, J. V. Henderson and J.-F. Thisse, eds., Amsterdam: North Holland.
[25] Ferguson, R. (2003). "Teachers' perceptions and expectations and the black-white test
score gap", Urban Education, Vol. 38, No. 4, 460-507.
[26] Fordham, S. and Ogbu, J. (1986) "Black students.school success: coping with the
Burden of Acting White", The Urban Review, XVIII , 176-206.
[27] Fortin, B. and Yazbeck, M. (2010) "Peer Eects and Fast Food Consumption".
[28] Glaeser, E. and Scheinkman, J. (2001) "Measuring Social Interactions," in Social Eco-
nomics (Durlauf and Young, eds.), Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001, 83-102.
[29] Graham, B.(2008) "Identifying Social Interactions through Conditional Variance Re-
strictions", Econometrica 76 , 643660.
[30] Graham, B.; Imbens, G and Ridder, G. (2009) "Measuring the average outcome and
inequality eects of segregation in the presence of social spillovers"
24[31] Guryan, J. (2004) "Desegregation and black dropout rates", American Economic Re-
view, 94 (4), 919943.
[32] Hanushek, E., Kain, J., Markman, J. and Rivkin, S. (2003) "Does Peer Ability Aect
Student Achievement?" Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 18, Iss. 5, 527-544.
[33] Hoxby, C. (2000) "Peer Eects in the Classroom: Learning from Gender and Race
Variation", NBER working paper no. 7867.
[34] Kremer, M., and Miguel E.(2007), "The Illusion of Sustainability", Quarterly Journal
of Economics 112, 10071065.
[35] Laschever, R. (2009), "The Doughboys Network: Social Interactions and the Employ-
ment of World War I Veterans"
[36] Lazear, E. (2001), "Educational Production", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116,
777803.
[37] Lin, X. (2010), "Identifying Peer Eects in Student Academic Achievement by Spatial
Autoregressive Models with Group Unobservables" Journal of Labor Economics, vol.
28, no. 4, 825-860.
[38] Manski, C. (1993), "Identication of Endogenous Social Eects: The Reection Prob-
lem", Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 60, No. 3, 531-542.
[39] Manski, C. (2000), "Economic analysis of social interactions", Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Vol 14, No. 3, 115136.
[40] Mott, R. (2001) "Policy Interventions, Low-Level Equilibria, and Social Interac-
tions",Social Dynamics, eds. S. Durlauf and P. Young. MIT Press, 2001.
[41] Moody, J. (2001) "Race, School Integration, and Friendship Integration in America",
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 107 No. 3, 679-716.
[42] Nechyba, T. (2006) "Income and Peer Quality Sorting in Public and Private Schools",
in Handbook of Economics of Education, vol 2, 1327-1368, Hanushek E. and Welch F.
eds, Elsevier.
25[43] Piketty, T. (2000) "Theories of persistent inequality and intergenerational mobility",
Handbook of Income Distribution 1, eds. Atkinson A. and Bourguignon F., Amsterdan
North-Holland, 430-476.
[44] Rivkin, S. and Welch, F. (2006). "Has school desegregation improved academic and
economic outcomes for blacks?" Handbook of the Economics of Education 2: 1019 -
1049 (E. Hanushek and F. Welch, Eds.). Amsterdam:North-Holland.
[45] Sacerdote, B. (2001) "Peer Eects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth
Roommates", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(2), 681-704.
[46] Soetevent, A. (2006) "Empirics of the identication of social interactions: An evaluation
of the approaches and their results", Journal of Economic Surveys, 20(2): 193 - 228.
[47] Zanella, G. (2007) "Discrete Choice with Social Interactions and Endogenous Member-
ships", Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol 5, No. 1, 122-53.
[48] Zimmerman, D, (2003) "Peer Eects in Academic Outcomes: Evidence from a Natural
Experiment", Review of Economics and Statistics, 85(1), 9-23.
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27Figure 2: Distributional impact: comparison with random peers
Table 1: Distribution of students (reading nal sample)
Distribution of students and number of peers named
Assignment question
Party 0 1 2 Total
0 0 186 147 333
1 181 1144 595 1920
2 84 557 4059 4700
Total 265 1887 4801 6953
Percentage that named one peer twice
Assignment question
Party 0 1 2 Total
1 - 68.2% 51.4% 56.6%
2 - 47.8% 34.3% 35.3%
Total - 55.4% 35.4% 39.5%
Percentage that named two peers twice
Assignment question
Party 0 1 2 Total
2 - - 43.4% 37.5%
Total - - 36.7% 25.4%
28Table 2: Distribution of students according to how many times they are named in the two questions
Assignment question
Party 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 14.4% 5.0% 2.1% 0.7% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
1 7.4% 12.8% 5.9% 2.5% 0.9% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0%
2 2.8% 7.1% 7.8% 4.0% 1.2% 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
3 0.8% 2.6% 4.1% 2.8% 1.6% 0.7% 0.4% 0.1% 0.1%
4 0.3% 0.7% 1.2% 1.6% 1.1% 0.6% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1%
5 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1%
6 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
7 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
8 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Distribution in nal sample after dropping observations with incomplete information.
99.7% of observations reported on this table, the remainder was named more than 8 times in one question.
Table 3: Mean individual and peer scores by network
Network Mean individual score Mean peer score
Reading








Party and assignment 512.0 523.8
Party 514.1 520.9
Assignment 513.9 531.1
School type (reading scores)
Private schools 577.1 591.2
Ordinary public schools 516.9 530.0
Full time (public) 488.4 505.3
Critical social context (public) 463.6 478.2
Rural (public) 476.9 477.9
29Table 4: Descriptive statistics
Full sample Final sample
Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD
Female 8805 0.49 0.50 6953 0.51 0.50
Repeated (1 or more ys) 8781 0.31 0.46 6953 0.26 0.44
Mother:  primary 7722 0.30 0.46 6953 0.28 0.45
Moth: incompl HS 7722 0.42 0.49 6953 0.42 0.49
Moth: HS-incompl college 7722 0.15 0.36 6953 0.16 0.37
Moth: compl college 7722 0.13 0.33 6953 0.14 0.34
Reading score 8605 501.6 101.9 6953 511.6 99.0
Math score 8371 501.6 102.4 6953 511.5 100.1
Science score 8402 501.1 101.1 6598 512.0 95.0
Number of peers named 8623 2.42 1.04 6953 2.38 0.91
Other variables in the data set no included to minimize loss of observations
Father:  primary 7259 0.32 0.47 6489 0.30 0.46
Fath: incompl HS 7259 0.45 0.5 6489 0.45 0.50
Fath: HS-incompl college 7259 0.14 0.35 6489 0.15 0.36
Fath: compl college 7259 0.09 0.29 6489 0.10 0.30
Numb. persons in house 7862 4.92 1.85 6948 4.86 1.80
Books: less 10 6979 0.28 0.45 6208 0.26 0.44
Books: btw 10 & 50 6979 0.35 0.48 6208 0.35 0.48
Books: more than 50 6979 0.37 0.48 6208 0.38 0.49
Slum 7862 0.12 0.32 6742 0.11 0.31
Final sample statistics for reading estimates except for math & science scores.
Table 5: Individual characteristics regressed on peers' characteristics.
Same variable for peers Same variable for peers
Mother:  primary 0.31*** -0.07***
(0.02) (0.02)
Moth: incompl HS 0.16*** -0.11***
(0.02) (0.02)
Moth: HS-incompl college 0.19*** -0.12***
(0.02) (0.02)
Moth: compl college 0.45*** -0.09***
(0.01) (0.01)




Repeated (1 or more ys) 0.44*** 0.20***
(0.02) (0.02)
Obs 6953 6953
Classroom xed eects no yes
Linear probability model for female and repeated.
Standard errors in parentheses
The mother education index ranges from 1 to 9 and summarizes dierent levels of education.
Years of education cannot be reconstructed precisely.
30Table 6: Distribution of students' and their peers' characteristics relative to the class median
% of peers with mothers' education Student with mothers' education Student with mother's education










Average % of peers above median 68.90% 64.66%
% of peers with reading scores Student with reading scores Student with reading scores










Average % of peers above median 57.44% 58.13%
% of peers with math scores Student with math scores Student with math scores










Average % of peers above median 60.57% 57.92%
% of peers with science scores Student with science scores Student with science scores










Average % of peers above median 58.18% 56.74%
31Table 7: OLS
Reading Math Science Reading Math Science
Endogenous eect 0.15*** 0.29*** 0.25*** -0.02 0.04** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Own characteristics
Female 0.12** -0.00 -0.03 0.11** 0.01 -0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Repeat -0.45*** -0.51*** -0.36*** -0.48*** -0.54*** -0.37***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother: incompl HS 0.14*** 0.10*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.07** 0.13***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother: compl HS-incompl college 0.45*** 0.31*** 0.40*** 0.37*** 0.25*** 0.35***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Mother: compl college 0.67*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.58*** 0.49*** 0.52***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Contextual eects
Female -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Repeat -0.05 0.10*** -0.01 -0.17*** -0.11*** -0.12***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Mother: incompl HS 0.14*** 0.03 0.06 0.09** 0.01 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Mother: compl HS-incompl college 0.30*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.22***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Mother: compl college 0.40*** 0.28*** 0.20*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.25***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 6,953 6,593 6,598 6,953 6,593 6,598
R-squared 0.26 0.31 0.23 0.11 0.11 0.07
Classroom xed eects no no no yes yes yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Own score and peer score normalized.
32Table 8: 2SLS
Reading Math Science
Endogenous eect 0.40*** 0.37*** 0.22
(0.11) (0.13) (0.16)
Own characteristics
Female 0.11* 0.02 -0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Repeat -0.45*** -0.51*** -0.36***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother: incompl HS 0.08*** 0.05** 0.12***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Mother: compl HS-incompl college 0.33*** 0.22*** 0.32***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Mother: compl college 0.51*** 0.43*** 0.48***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Contextual eects
Female -0.04 -0.02 -0.01
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Repeat 0.08 0.12 -0.02
(0.08) (0.10) (0.08)
Mother: incompl HS 0.04 -0.04 0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Mother: compl HS-incompl college 0.02 0.10 0.12
(0.09) (0.08) (0.10)
Mother: compl college -0.07 0.06 0.10
(0.14) (0.11) (0.15)
Excluded instruments (rst stage)
Peers' peers motheduc 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.08***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Peers' peers peers motheduc 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Observations 6,953 6,593 6,598
F test excluded inst 13.89 11.91 10.38
P-val overidentication test 0.81 0.37 0.94
Number of clusters 318 316 318
Classroom xed eects yes yes yes
Standard errors clustered at the school level in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Own score and peer score normalized.
Table 9: Degree of diculty and preferences for reading, math and science
Can you easily understand what is taught in class?
Reading Math Science
Almost always 40.0% 35.7% 44.0%
Sometimes 50.7% 54.1% 47.6%
Almost never 9.4% 10.2% 8.4%
Do you like what is taught in class?
Reading Math Science
Almost always 59.2% 65.0% 67.6%
Sometimes 33.5% 30.1% 25.8%
Almost never 7.3% 4.9% 6.6%
33Table 10: 2SLS using additional information
Reading Math Science
Endogenous eect 0.43*** 0.40*** 0.25
(0.12) (0.13) (0.17)
Own characteristics
Female 0.10* 0.01 -0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Repeat -0.44*** -0.50*** -0.35***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother: incompl HS 0.08*** 0.06** 0.12***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Mother: compl HS-incompl college 0.33*** 0.22*** 0.31***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Mother: compl college 0.50*** 0.43*** 0.48***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Contextual eects
Female -0.03 -0.00 0.00
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Repeat 0.10 0.15 0.01
(0.08) (0.10) (0.09)
Mother: incompl HS 0.04 -0.05 0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Mother: compl HS-incompl college 0.01 0.09 0.11
(0.10) (0.08) (0.11)
Mother: compl college -0.09 0.05 0.08
(0.14) (0.11) (0.15)
Observations 6,953 6,593 6,598
F test excluded inst 13.46 11.62 10.62
P-val overidentication test 0.75 0.37 0.91
Number of clusters 319 320 322
Classroom xed eects yes yes yes
Standard errors clustered at the school level in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Own score and peer score normalized.
34Table 11: Estimations excluding classrooms that exhibit some selection on observables among peers
Classrooms with low correlations among Classrooms with low correlation among
individual's and peers' parental education individuals and peers being repeaters
Reading Math Science Reading Math Science
Endogenous eect 0.34** 0.28 0.18 0.42*** 0.38*** 0.36**
(0.14) (0.18) (0.19) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16)
Own characteristics
Female 0.11* 0.02 -0.01 0.10 0.01 0.08
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Repeat -0.46*** -0.50*** -0.36*** -0.44*** -0.50*** -0.35***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother: incompl HS 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.05* 0.13***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother: compl HS-incompl college 0.35*** 0.22*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.20*** 0.27***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Mother: compl college 0.52*** 0.44*** 0.49*** 0.47*** 0.45*** 0.47***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Contextual eects
Female -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.06
(0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)
Repeat 0.04 0.05 -0.06 0.07 0.14 0.01
(0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09)
Mother: incompl HS 0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.06 -0.07 -0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Mother: compl HS-incompl college 0.04 0.10 0.11 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04
(0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11)
Mother: compl college 0.02 0.07 0.12 -0.02 0.04 -0.04
(0.15) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.17)
F test excluded inst 7.97 5.92 7.22 9.34 9.51 7.34
P-val overidentication test 0.67 0.56 0.85 0.83 0.20 0.82
Observations 6,095 5,680 5,690 4,426 4,127 4,098
Classroom xed eects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Standard errors clustered at the school level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Own score and peer score normalized.
35Table 12: Years of schooling instead of school dummies
Reading Math Science Reading Math Science
Endogenous eect 0.34** 0.37* 0.09 0.35** 0.33* 0.10
(0.17) (0.21) (0.20) (0.15) (0.18) (0.21)
Own characteristics
Female 0.12** 0.01 -0.02 0.12** 0.01 -0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
Repeat -0.44*** -0.49*** -0.35*** -0.43*** -0.49*** -0.35***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Moth. years of schooling 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Contextual eects
Female -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
(0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Repeat 0.04 0.13 -0.06 0.04 0.10 -0.06
(0.09) (0.14) (0.09) (.09) (0.13) (0.09)
Moth. years of schooling -0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Excluded instruments (rst stage)
Peers' peers moth. yearsch 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Peers' peers peers moth. yearsch 0.03* 0.02 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
F test excluded inst 17.50 15.50 15.25 9.50 7.97 7.72
P-val overidentication test 0.83 0.53 0.68
Observations 6,953 6,593 6,598 6,953 6,593 6,598
Classroom xed eects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Standard errors clustered at the school level in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Own score and peer score normalized.
Table 13: Other reference group specications
Endogenous eects
Reading Math Science
Party network 0.37 0.30** 0.31*
(0.27) (0.14) (0.17)
F test 3.21 8.30 8.12
Obs 6,458 6,057 6,054
Essay network 0.56*** 0.42** 0.13
(0.11) (0.21) (0.15)
F test 13.69 6.32 14.55
Obs 6,529 6,160 6,141
Weighting peers named twice more 0.37*** 0.34** 0.20
(0.11) (0.13) (0.15)
F test 13.96 11.79 12.02
Obs 6,953 6,953 6,598
Standard errors clustered at the school level in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Own score and peer score normalized.
36Table 14: Heterogeneous eects
Reading
Mother's education Gender
 Primary Incompl HS HS-incompl college Compl college Females Males
Endogenous eect -0.20 0.33** 1.49 -0.14 0.59*** 0.44***
(0.23) (0.14) (0.89) (0.61) (0.16) (0.17)
Exogenous eects
Female 0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.07 -0.02 -0.08
(0.11) (0.09) (0.29) (0.28) (0.11) (0.11)
Repeat -0.29* 0.07 0.77 -0.34 0.12 0.10
(0.16) (0.10) (0.79) (0.54) (0.12) (0.12)
Moth. incompl HS 0.21*** -0.02 -0.20 0.32 -0.03 0.11
(0.07) (0.06) (0.31) (0.33) (0.07) (0.07)
Moth. compl HS-incomp college 0.39** -0.02 -0.61 0.54 -0.10 0.08
(0.17) (0.11) (0.36) (0.39) (0.15) (0.13)
Moth. compl college 0.44 0.04 -1.20 0.41 -0.37 0.03
(0.3) (0.16) (0.74) (0.48) (0.24) (0.17)
F test excluded instruments 6.4 14.13 2.04 1.20 8.94 7.95
Obs 1924 2919 1038 868 3549 3397
Math
Endogenous eect 0.18 0.42*** -0.44 0.42 0.35** 0.49***
(0.21) (0.23) (0.54) (0.97) (0.17) (0.17)
Exogenous eects
Female -0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.22 -0.08 -0.05
(0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.24) (0.08) (0.08)
Repeat -0.01 0.21 -0.83 0.04 0.12 0.16
(0.15) (0.17) (0.58) (0.90) (0.13) (0.14)
Moth. incompl HS 0.07 -0.11 0.10 0.14 -0.05 -0.09
(0.08) (0.07) (0.22) (0.32) (0.06) (0.08)
Moth. compl HS-incomp college 0.08 0.04 0.33 0.20 0.18* 0.05
(0.15) (0.10) (0.27) (0.29) (0.10) (0.12)
Moth. compl college 0.18 0.05 0.66 0.03 0.16 0.02
(0.22) (0.17) (0.36) (0.29) (0.17) (0.16)
F test excluded instruments 11.31 6.31 2.29 0.63 9.09 8.01
Obs 1791 2761 997 844 3363 3222
Standard errors clustered at the school level in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Own score and peer score normalized.
37Table 15: Changes in the distribution of reading and math scores
Reading Math
Percentiles Actual score After reshuing Actual score After reshuing
5 369.4 368.6 367.5 376.2
10 395.0 397.5 396.0 406.3
15 414.2 417.3 418.5 427.2
20 428.7 434.0 432.1 442.4
25 446.3 448.8 447.2 454.9
30 453.9 461.5 458.4 466.7
35 468.4 473.1 472.5 478.3
40 479.5 484.2 480.4 488.5
45 488.5 494.9 493.9 498.8
50 501.5 506.0 505.5 509.1
55 515.2 517.1 518.7 519.2
60 528.8 528.9 531.6 530.1
65 541.1 541.8 544.9 541.8
70 556.8 555.2 558.0 555.3
75 572.4 569.1 573.6 568.7
80 588.9 586.2 592.0 582.4
85 613.0 606.2 614.4 601.8
90 642.3 631.4 639.0 625.4
95 678.8 671.3 680.7 662.9
Gap 95-5 309.4 302.6 313.1 286.7
38